Local versus aggregate lending channels : the effects of securitization on corporate credit supply by Jiménez Zambrano, Gabriel et al.
LOCAL VERSUS AGGREGATE 
LENDING CHANNELS:
THE EFFECTS OF SECURITIZATION 
ON CORPORATE CREDIT SUPPLY
Gabriel Jiménez, Atif Mian, 
José-Luis Peydró and Jesús Saurina
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1124
2011
LOCAL VERSUS AGGREGATE LENDING CHANNELS: 
THE EFFECTS OF SECURITIZATION ON CORPORATE CREDIT SUPPLY
LOCAL VERSUS AGGREGATE LENDING CHANNELS: 





UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY
José-Luis Peydró
ECB AND UPF AND BARCELONA GSE 
Jesús Saurina
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
(*) The results or views expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Banco de España, European Central Bank or the Eurosystem. Corresponding authors: atif@haas.berkeley.edu 
and jose.peydro@gmail.com. We thank Michael Weber for excellent research assistance and Asim Khwaja and 
Amir Sufi for extremely helpful comments and discussion. We would also like to thank seminar participants at the 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, European Central Bank, MIT, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, New 
York Federal Reserve, University of Michigan (Ross), Notre Dam, and University of California Berkeley and also 
Joshua Angrist, Xavier Freixas and Jaume Ventura for helpful comments. Financial support from the Coleman 
Fung Risk Management Research Center at University of California Berkeley is gratefully acknowledged.
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1124
2011
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2011
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print)
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Depósito legal: M. 39738-2011
Unidad de Publicaciones, Banco de España
Abstract
While banks may change their credit supply due to bank balance-sheet shocks (the local 
lending channel), fi rms can react by adjusting their sources of fi nancing in equilibrium (the 
aggregate lending channel). We provide a methodology to identify the aggregate (fi rm-level) 
effects of the lending channel and estimate the impact of banks’ ability to securitize real-
estate assets on credit supply for non real-estate fi rms in Spain over 2000-2010. We show 
that fi rm-level equilibrium dynamics nullify the strong local (bank-level) lending channel 
of securitization on credit quantity for fi rms with multiple banking relationships. Credit 
terms however become softer, but there are no real effects. Securitization implies a credit 
expansion on the extensive margin towards fi rst-time bank clients, which are more likely to 
default. Finally, the 2008 securitization collapse reverses the local lending channel.
Keywords: Bank lending channel, credit supply, credit demand, macroprudential, real 
economy effects of fi nance, securitization.
JEL classifi cation: G21, G28, G01, G30, E44, E50.
Resumen
Mientras que los bancos pueden cambiar su oferta de crédito tras sufrir shocks que afectan 
a sus balances (el canal local del préstamo), las empresas pueden reaccionar ajustando 
sus fuentes de fi nanciación en equilibrio (el canal agregado del préstamo). En este papel 
proporcionamos una metodología para identifi car los efectos agregados (a nivel de empresa) 
del canal del préstamo y estimamos el impacto que la habilidad de los bancos para titulizar 
activos inmobiliarios tienen sobre la oferta de crédito para las empresas no fi nancieras en 
España en el periodo 2000-2010. Mostramos que las dinámicas del equilibrio a nivel de 
empresa-banco anulan el fuerte canal del préstamo observado a nivel local (nivel de banco) 
de la titulización sobre la cantidad de crédito para las empresas con múltiples relaciones 
bancarias. Sin embargo, las condiciones de los préstamos se suavizan aunque no existen 
efectos reales. La titulización implica una expansión de crédito en el margen extensivo hacia 
clientes nuevos, que son más propensos al impago. Finalmente, el colapso de la titulización 
en 2008 invierte el canal local del préstamo.
Palabras claves: Canal del préstamo de los bancos, oferta de crédito, demanda de crédito, 
macroprudencial, efectos económicos reales de las fi nanzas, titulización.
Códigos JEL: G21, G28, G01, G30, E44, E50.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1124
1 Introduction
The banking sector often takes center stage in economic controversies. Banks are accused of
excessive credit creation and asset bubbles on the upside, and of being too stingy with credit
on the downside, with important consequences for nancial stability and economic activity.
The primary suspect in such scenarios is the credit supply channel, i.e. credit growth (or lack
thereof) dictated by frictions in the credit supply process rather than economic fundamentals.
Securitization has been over the last decade a crucial nancial instrument and, by aecting
bank capital and liquidity, may have strongly in uenced credit supply (Shin, 2009).1
While shocks to balance sheets of banks may have real eects via credit supply (Bernanke
1983; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Diamond and Rajan 2006; Allen and Gale 2007; Kiyotaki
and Gertler, 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Stein 1997 and 2011),
how do we know that observed  uctuations in credit are driven by supply shifts, and not by
demand fundamentals? Most calls for policy makers to “lean against the wind” in the midst
of a credit boom, or to subsidize banks in a credit crunch as in the recent crisis with trillions
of euros, are based on the premise that the primary failure lies on the supply side.
Furthermore, it is increasingly recognized that credit supply side failures at the bank
level (the “local” lending channel eect) only re ect partial equilibrium outcomes. The
general equilibrium eects could be very dierent and require a “macroprudential approach”
(Trichet 2009; Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2010). For example, a reduction in credit supply
due to an adverse balance sheet shock to some banks may not have any negative real eect
if aected rms can go elsewhere to compensate for the loss in credit. We refer to the latter
response as the “aggregate” lending channel eect. Indeed proponents of non-interventionist
central banking, such as Mulligan (2008), argue that such general equilibrium eects are
strong enough to let credit markets heal on their own. Unnecessary interventions, they
argue, create more mischief by punctuating the virtuous cycle of creative destruction.
1Bank capital and liquidity in uence the severity of frictions stemming from moral hazard, adverse se-
lection and coordination problems in banks (see e.g. Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Morrison and White, 2005;
Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). Therefore, securitization of real estate assets — by aecting bank balance-
sheet strength (capital and liquidity) — makes credit supply endogenous to securitization, even for the loans
to the non-real estate sector (see e.g. Shin, 2009).
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This paper formalizes a methodology that estimates the supply side eects of aggregate
(and local) bank lending channels and applies our methodology to estimate the aggregate
and local eects of securitization on the supply of credit.
First, our approach separates the impact of supply from demand of credit while taking
into account rm-level equilibrium adjustments. It builds upon earlier work by Khwaja and
Mian 2008 (KM henceforth). KM estimate the (local) supply-induced credit channel eect
at the loan-level by using rm xed eects that absorb credit demand shocks (fundamentals)
experienced by a rm. To analyze the (aggregate) rm-level credit supply implications, we
extend this technique by estimating the otherwise unobservable covariance between bank-
specic credit supply shocks and rm-specic credit demand shocks. We then use this
covariance term to construct an unbiased estimate of the aggregate impact of the bank
lending channel that explicitly takes into account rm-level equilibrium adjustments.
Second, we identify the eects of banks’ ability to securitize real-estate assets on credit
supply for non real-estate rms. Using the exhaustive credit from Spain over 2000Q1-2009Q4,
we investigate the possible lending channel consequences of securitization for credit volume,
terms and defaults and also for rm real eects. The rapid expansion in global market for
securitized products enabled Spanish banks — especially those with large real estate assets —
to potentially access wholesale nancing by securitizing their real estate assets.2
Using ex-ante variation in real estate holdings to proxy for the capacity of banks to
securitize assets during the securitization boom, we test whether securitization of real estate
assets expanded credit supply and encouraged riskier lending in the non-real estate sectors
of the economy.3 We utilize a comprehensive loan level data set for this purpose from the
credit register of the Bank of Spain. The data include loan level information for all bank
loans granted at quarterly frequency from 1999Q4 to 2009Q4 in Spain, a bank dominated
nancial system. This information is then merged with balance sheet information for the
borrower (rms) and the lender (banks).
2We use the term “securitization” to include both covered bonds and asset-backed securities.
3Shin (2009) presents a possible mechansim through which securitization might impact credit supply for
all type of loans. More generally, securitization by aectting the ability to access future liquidity (against
illiquid assets) it can aect current bank credit supply for all type of loans (see e.g. Diamond and Rajan,
2006; Allen and Gale, 2007).
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We show that securitization is indeed higher for banks with more real estate assets before
the boom, and that these banks have stronger ex-post credit growth for non-real-estate rms.
We use rm xed-eects to absorb rm fundamentals (credit demand shocks) at borrower-
level and show that the securitization-induced credit growth is primarily driven by changes
in the banks’ credit supply. Thus improved access to wholesale nancing allows banks to
increase credit supply. The eect is also economically large: one standard deviation increase
in ex-ante exposure to real estate more than doubles the growth in credit supply to non-real-
estate rms between 2004 and 2007.
Despite a large local lending channel eect at the bank-rm level, the net impact of
securitization at the rm level — the aggregate lending channel — is signicantly lower due
to “crowding out” of credit at the rm level. Crowding out may occur for several reasons:
First, some rms may not be credit constrained and, hence, may not want to increase their
net borrowing. If a bank oers to increase its credit supply for such a rm, the rm is likely
to demand better terms and likely to cut back its borrowing from other banks. Second, even
for rms that are credit-constrained, banks may not be willing to go beyond the rms’ total
debt capacity.4 A unique advantage of our methodology is that we can incorporate such
crowding out eects and still isolate credit supply from demand.
We nd strong support for the crowding out hypothesis. For the set of rms with multiple
borrowing banking relationships at the time of securitization boom, the aggregate lending
channel eect is close to zero despite a large local lending channel eect for these rms!5
Crowding out thus dramatically reduces the net impact of securitization-induced credit sup-
ply on the quantity of credit.
There is, however, a signicant impact on the price of credit in the aggregate lending
channel. We show that rms with unused lines of credit start to disproportionately fa-
4Due to agency problems (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)), a lower cost
of debt (from credit supply shocks) may not translate into higher aggregate rm-level credit volume. For
example, total borrowing capacity of rms may be xed in the short run if they need to have scarce collateral
or equity to credibly commit to banks against future misbehavior. In such a scenario, greater willingness by
some banks to lend is likely to lead to a shift in borrowing towards banks that want to expand credit rather
than an aggregate (rm-level) increase in lending.
5As we explain in detail later, these results are based on rms with multiple banking relationships at the
start of securitzation boom in 2004 (so that we can use rm xed eects to control for rm fundamentals in
loan-level regressions). Such rms represent almost 80 percent of overall bank credit in Spain.
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vor banks with greater access to securitization, suggesting improved credit terms through a
revealed preference argument. Consistent with this interpretation, we also nd that securiti-
zation leads to a reduction in the rate of collateralization and a lengthening of loan maturity.
All these results suggest that securitization leads to softer lending terms for borrowers.
Despite the zero aggregate impact of securitization-induced credit supply channel on the
quantity of credit, there could be some positive real eects through the eect on credit
terms. However, we nd no evidence of any impact on real rm outcomes, including rm
sales, employment, and default rate.
The results above are based on rms that already have borrowing relationships at the
time of securitization boom. When we look at the eect of securitization on the extensive
margin of lending to new clients, we nd a large eect on credit quantity. Growth in credit
to new clients between 2004 and 2007 is much stronger for banks with greater exposure to
securitization. A one standard deviation increase in ex-ante exposure to real estate assets
generates credit to new clients that is equivalent to 10.7 percent of bank assets. Moreover,
new credit granted is riskier for banks with higher ex-ante real estate assets, as it is about a
third more likely to default.
All in all, securitization leads to softer credit terms for rms with established access to
credit but has no impact on their total borrowing or real outcomes. However, it does have
a large eect on credit extension to new clients that turn out to be signicantly more risky.
The expansion in credit adds fragility to the nancial system as new loans are signicantly
more likely to default during the downturn.6
Finally, we analyze whether the 2008 collapse in the securitization market implies a credit
crunch. There is a sharp reversal in the local lending channel as banks with higher ex-ante
exposure to real estate signicantly cut back their credit supply. However, the aggregate
impact is more modest as rms are partially able to adjust their borrowing from other (less
aected) banks.
6These results are consistent with Shin (2009), as his model suggests that securitization — by increasing
credit supply to marginal, new borrowers — increases credit risk, and hence can be detrimental for nancial
stability (see also Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and Broecker (1990) for theories in which higher loan
defaults stem from banks’ lending to new borrowers in expansions). Results are also consistent with models
in which higher bank liquidity implies more risk-taking in bank lending due to banks’ moral hazard (see e.g.
Allen and Gale, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2001).
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Our paper contributes to the literature on bank transmission mechanism in several ways.7
First, we are the rst to formally incorporate the equilibrium feedback eects from bor-
rowers when estimating the bank transmission channel (while still isolating credit supply
from rm fundamentals).8 As theory shows, the bank lending channel is important only if
there are real economy or nancial stability implications. Therefore, it is crucial to identify
the aggregate (rm-level) eects of the banking lending (supply) channel. The results of
some of the previous studies that estimate the transmission channel at the bank level — such
as Kashyap and Stein (2000) — may be incomplete without incorporating rm level equi-
librium responses. Indeed, our own analysis of Spanish banks reveals that while the bank
transmission mechanism is strong, its aggregate (net) impact is reduced due to the rm level
crowding out eect for large segments of the economy.
Second, the role of nancial innovation in precipitating credit booms and subsequent -
nancial crises through the nancial intermediary system is emphasized by numerous economic
historians (e.g. White (1996), Calorimis (2008), Bordo (2009) and Kindleberger (1978)).
Most recently, Kohn (2009) notes “the tendency for nancial crises to be preceded by bub-
bles spurred by nancial liberalization or innovations”. Our paper provides the rst formal
evidence on the extent to which nancial innovation — in the form of securitization — induces
banks to extend more credit supply and at riskier terms.
Third, there is an emerging literature on the eects of securitization on lending. Secu-
ritization is associated with lax lending and excessive credit creation in mortgage markets
during the 2000’s (Keys et al (2010) and Mian and Su (2009)). Loutskina and Strahan
(2009) show that securitizability of a mortgage loan helps disconnect the dependence of loan
origination on bank nancials. As Shin (2009) among others show, securitization may aect
7A partial list on the empirical side includes Bernanke (1983), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Peek and
Rosengren (2000), Ashcraft (2005), Paravisini (2008), Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), Iyer and Peydró (2011),
Jiménez, Ongena, Saurina and Peydró (forthcoming).
8Peek and Rosengren (2000) identify real eects and Paravisini (2008) identies total borrower debt by
exploiting credit supply shocks that are independent of economic fundamentals. However, given that the
majority of interesting shocks to banks (e.g. crises, runs, monetary policy, capital) are not independent of
economic fundamentals, a key contribution of our paper is to incorporate a general methodology to identify
the aggregate lending (supply) channel (controlling for observed and unobserved rm fundamentals).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1124
the general supply of credit, thus we contribute to this literature by analyzing the eects of
securitization on bank lending standards and credit risk for non real-estate business loans.9
Fourth, there is also an emerging literature linking credit supply to capital structure.
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) nd that rms with a credit rating have higher leverage
than those without. Leary (2009) exploits shocks to the US banking system in the 1960s and
nds changes in rm capital structure. Rice and Strahan (2010), using the Survey of Small
Business Finance, nd that changes in banking competition do not aect credit volume but
price (Petersen and Rajan (1994) also analyze the SSBF). We contribute to this literature by
proposing a way to control for both observed and unobserved rm fundamentals (demand)
in order to identify the aggregate rm level impact of credit supply.
Fifth, our proposed methodology uses loan-level credit register data that are increasingly
available in many countries around the world.10 Our tool is thus practical to implement
and should help policy makers gain a better understanding of the overall strength of the
credit supply channel in the economy. This is even more important nowadays given the new
macroprudential supervision powers for the Fed and the ECB and given also the new bank
capital and liquidity regulation (Basel III). Moreover, as observers such as Mulligan (2008)
have emphasized, incorporating the borrowing equilibrium eects — that we formalize — is
critical for proper evaluation of central bank interventions.
Finally, there is some related work on the Spanish banking system using data similar to
ours. Jiménez et al. (forthcoming and 2011) evaluate the credit channel of monetary policy.
They nd a signicant eect of monetary policy on credit supply and risk taking. Our
paper diers in its focus on securitization, as well as in introducing a new methodology that
incorporates equilibrium crowding out eects. We also provide evidence on real outcomes
that earlier studies did not have access to.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical founda-
tion for our empirical methodology. Section 3 describes the data and institutional details.
Sections 4, 5 and 6 present empirical results and section 7 concludes.
9Our paper is also related to Shivdasani and Wang (2011). They nd that the leveraged buyout boom of
2004-2007 was fueled by growth in collaterialized debt obligations (and other forms of securitization).
10There are at least 129 countries with either public or private credit registers (Djankov, McLiesh and
Shleifer, 2007).
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2 Methodology
2.1 Basic Model
We outline our basic methodology for estimating the net impact of credit supply channel
eect. Consider an economy with banks and rms indexed by l and m respectively. Firm m
borrows from qm banks at time w and assume (without loss of generality) that it borrows the
same amount from each of the qm banks.
The economy experiences two shocks at w : a rm-specic credit demand shock m and
a bank-specic credit supply shock l= m re ects changes in the rm’s fundamentals as for
example productivity or customer demand shocks, which are largely unobserved. l re ects
changes in the bank’s funding situation, such as a run on short term liabilities (a negative
shock) or new opportunities to access wholesale nancing (a positive shock). In this paper,
l is access to securitization that we proxy with the initial exposure to real estate assets of
bank l.
Let |lm denote the log change in credit from bank l to rm m= Then the basic credit channel
equation in the face of credit supply and demand shocks can be written as:
|lm = +   l + m + %lm (1)
Equation (1) assumes that the change in bank credit from bank l to rm m is determined
by an economy wide secular trend > credit supply and credit demand shocks, and an idio-
syncratic shock %lm= While equation (1) is reduced form in nature, it can be derived as an
equilibrium condition by explicitly modeling credit supply and demand schedules (see KM).
We keep the analysis deliberately simple here to focus on the core estimation problem.
In a frictionless world (as in the Modigliani-Miller theorem), bank lending is independent
of credit supply conditions and only depends on “fundamental” credit demand factors. Fi-
nancial intermediaries in such scenarios have no impact on the economy and, hence, there is
no bank transmission channel, i.e.  = 0 in equation (1). The presence of nancing frictions,
however, may force banks to pass on their credit supply shocks l to borrowing rms, making
 A 0=
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 if often referred to as the “bank lending channel”, and we refer to it as the local lending
channel in this paper. It can be estimated from (1) using OLS, giving us bROV = +Fry(l>m)Y du(l) =
The expression implies that as long as credit supply and demand shocks are signicantly
correlated, bROV in (1) would be a biased estimate of the true . For example, if banks
receiving a positive liquidity shock are more likely to lend to rms that simultaneously
receive a positive credit demand boost, then  would be biased upwards.11 KM resolve this
issue by focusing on rms with qm  2> and absorbing out m through rm xed-eects. The
estimated coe!cient bIH then provides an unbiased estimate of =
However, bIH does not give us a complete picture of the net eect of bank lending channel
on the economy. In particular, individual rms aected by the local lending channel due to
a positive  in equation (1) may seek alternative sources of bank nancing to compensate
for any loss of credit. Alternatively, if rms benet from greater provision of credit via a
positive credit supply shock to an individual bank, their borrowing from elsewhere may be
cut either voluntarily or due to a crowding-out eect. Thus, in order to gain a complete
picture of the credit channel eect, one must compute its consequences at the aggregate rm
level. We can do so by estimating the rm version of (1):
|m = +   m + m + %m (2)
|m denotes the log change in credit for rm m across all banks.12 It is not a simple average
of |lm from (1) since a rm can start borrowing from new banks as well (potentially a key
margin for rms’ adjustment of credit supply shocks). m denote the average initial exposure





, where Qm represents
the set of banks lending to rm m at time w= %m is an idiosyncratic error term. The same
credit demand shock m appears in both equations (1) and (2) under the assumption that
the shock on rm fundamentals equally aects a rm’s borrowing from all banks.
The aggregate impact of credit supply channel is captured by the coe!cient > which we
11For example, Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) nd that banks closer to the minimum capital
requirements lend more to low net worth (zombie) rms. In this case, l and m would be correlated.
12Depending on data availability, it could include non-bank sources of credit as well.
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refer to as the aggregate lending channel. If there is no adjustment at rm-level in the face
of bank-specic credit channel shocks, then  = = However if there is some adjustment at
rm-level, for example a crowding-out eect, then  should be less (in absolute value) than
=
How does one estimate ? An OLS estimate of (2) yields bROV = +Fry(l>m)Y du(m) =13 While the
variance of m can be estimated in data, the covariance term between credit demand and credit
supply shocks is unobservable to the econometrician. However, a unique advantage of the
preceding xed-eects estimator at loan level is that it allows us to back-out the covariance
term. Since bIH is an unbiased estimate of > we can write Fry(l> m) = ³bROV  bIH´ 
Y du(l)> where variance of bank credit supply shocks l can be estimated directly from data.
Thus the aggregate lending channel eect, > can be estimated as:
b = bROV  ³bROV  bIH´  Y du(l)Y du(m) (3)
The second term on the right hand side of (3) is the adjustment term that corrects
for any bias in the OLS estimate of (2). The adjustment term corrects for the otherwise
unobserved covariance between credit supply and demand shocks. The extra variance term
in the denominator corrects for the fact that the variance of bank shocks averaged at the
rm level may be dierent from the variance of bank shocks overall.
Equation (3) summarizes our methodology for estimating the net impact of bank credit
supply channel. It is simple and practical to implement as loan level credit register data are
now available in most countries of the world. The procedure can be summarized as follows.
For any given bank shock l that is suspected of generating a transmission channel, run
OLS and FE versions of (1) to estimate bROV and bIH respectively. Then estimate rm
level equation (2) using OLS to generate bROV= Finally plug these three coe!cients in (3) to
estimate the unbiased impact of credit supply channel at the rm level.




qm > m) = Fry(l> m)=
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2.2 Calibration and Robustness
Our model uses simplifying assumptions to keep the analysis tractable. Real world data
may not satisfy some of these assumptions. How robust is our core result, i.e. equation
(3), to such perturbations? Since close-form solutions are not possible with more generic
assumptions, we present numerical solutions to our model under alternative scenarios.
Table I summarizes the results of our simulation exercise. Panel A takes our baseline
scenario, i.e. the model presented above, and calibrates it using dierent assumptions on two
key parameters of interest: the (unobservable) correlation between credit demand and credit
supply shocks (), and the extent of rm-level adjustment to bank transmission shocks (\).
\ = 100% implies there is full adjustment at the rm-level making  = 0= The calibration
exercise assumes that true  = 0=5 and shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and
variance equal to 1.0.14 The results show that while OLS estimates bROV and bROV can
be signicantly biased with high absolute levels of > our xed-eects and bias-correction
procedure in (3) successfully backs out the true coe!cients of interest. In a way, Panel A
also serves as a “numerical proof” of our baseline methodology.
The baseline analysis assumes that banks continue to lend to rms after realization of
shocks. This may not happen in practice. Some loans may be dropped for idiosyncratic
reasons and others due to either credit supply or credit demand shocks. Our OLS and FE
regressions from the preceding section ignores such dropped loans. Does ignoring dropped
loans change the results in Panel A? We test this by simulating dropped loans and then
running our estimation procedure on surviving loans. In particular, add a rst-stage before
our estimation procedure that drops some loans from our sample depending on the loans’
credit demand shock, the credit supply shock, and an idiosyncratic factor. The probability
of a loan getting dropped is modelled as a probit, with weights on various factors chosen to
match what we nd in data.15 We then rerun our estimation procedure on the remaining
sample. The results in Panel B show that our estimate of betas remains valid even when
conditioning on loans that do not get dropped.16
14The variance roughly re ects the variance of rm-level credit changes from 2004Q4 to 2007Q4.
15We set these parameters such that the coe!cient on supply shock is -0.25 (as we will see in column (7)
of table 5). The coe!cient on demand shock is also assigned the same magnitude. Finally, the level eect is
chosen such that about a third of total loans are dropped, as in our Spanish data.
16Our model also assumes that each rm borrows the same amount initially from its set of lenders. We
also tested for robustness of our results to this assumption by similating borrowing across banks by a rm
that matches our data. Our methodology continues to perform very well with these changes.
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3 Data and Institutional Background
3.1 Data
Our data come from loan level credit register of the central bank of Spain (Banco de España),
which is also the banking supervisor in Spain. It covers all loans to all non-nancial rms. For
computational purposes, we restrict to loans with an average borrowing of at least 60,000.
We further restrict the data to non-real-estate loans in order to avoid the concern that our
results may be spuriously driven by the boom in real estate sector during our sample period.
The data come at quarterly frequency and cover the period from the fourth quarter of
1999 to the fourth quarter of 2009. The 10 year coverage has the advantage of covering
the full lending cycle in Spain. There are 487,090 rms borrowing from any of a possible
of 215 banks during this time period. In order to avoid data management issues due to
large size, we randomly sample 10% of the rms based on the random, penultimate digit of
the rm scal identity number. Once a rm is selected we keep all of its loans over the 10
year period in our sample. Our 10% random sample consists of 48,709 rms. While a rm
may have multiple loans from the same bank at a point in time, we aggregate loans at the
rm-bank-quarter level which forms our unit of analysis. Thus a “loan” in this paper refers
to a rm-bank pair.
Firms can enter and exit the sample during our sample period. The average tenure of a
rm in our sample is 25.7 quarters (out of a possible of 41 quarters), with a median tenure of
26 quarters and 25th and 75th percentile of 14 and 41 quarters respectively. The distribution
of bank credit across rms is highly skewed with top 10% of rms borrow 75.3% of total
credit in the economy (Figure 1, top-left panel). The skewed nature of rm-size distribution
is typical around the world. The dotted line in the top-left panel of Figure 1 shows that the
cumulative distribution function of credit across banks is very similar to the CDF picture
for rms. As with rms, the top 10% of banks dominate the credit market.
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There is a tendency for banks to merge over our sample period as well. There are 246
banks at the beginning of sample period and 214 banks by our sample’s end. However, major
bank mergers (in terms of size) happen before 2001Q4. Therefore, in order to keep a more
consistent panel, we focus on the period 2001Q4 till 2009Q4 in our analysis.17 Since our core
variation of interest occurs in mid-2000’s, starting in 2001Q4 does not constrain our analysis.
The top-right panel in Figure 1 plots the total cumulative bank credit over time. There
is a sharp increase in the growth of bank credit in 2004 followed by sudden stagnation in
2008 when the global nancial crisis hits. One of our aims in this paper is to test the
extent to which the boom in credit between 2004 and 2007 can be attributed to the rise in
securitization. As such many of our tests focus on loans outstanding in 2004Q4, and follow
them forward.18
Table II presents summary statistics for this set of rms. There are 29,848 rms taking
out 67,838 loans in the fourth quarter of 2004. Since our methodology relies on rms with at
least two banking relationships, Table II also presents summary statistics for this subset of
rms. There are 15,697 such rms taking out 51,397 loans. While about half the total rms
have multiple banking relationships, they represent 78% of total rm credit in the economy.
The average loan size is 288,000 and the average rm borrows a total of 662,000 from
the banking sector. 1.9% of loans are in default as of 2004Q4. However, there is a sharp
increase in defaults in 2008 and, by the end of 2009, almost 8% of loans are in default (Figure
1 bottom-left panel).
One of our key variables at bank level is a bank’s exposure to real estate assets at the
beginning of our sample period. This variable is constructed as the share of total bank loans
that go to the real estate sector as of 2001Q1 (residential mortgages as well as loans to
construction and real estate rms). The average exposure to real estate sector is 44% with a
standard deviation of 15.7%. The idea is to take into account the original stock of nancial
assets that directly or indirectly can be easily securitized.19
17If a bank is acquired by another bank, its loan portfolio shows up in the portfolio of the acquiring bank
in our sample.
18There are 192 banks in 2004Q4.
19There was almost no securitization of loan to real estate developers in Spain. However, these loans turn
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1124
Finally, we also have information at the loan level on total loan commitments, credit
drawn, whether the loan is collateralized by an asset and the maturity of the loan. For a
large subset of rms we also have information on total assets, sales and number of employees.
Summary statistics of all these variables are presented in Table II.
3.2 The Spanish Financial System
Since securitization is largely limited to real estate loans, we discuss some key features of
the Spanish mortgage industry. There is no counterpart to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in
Spain. Consequently all mortgage loans are held by banks on their books in the beginning
of our sample period when there is negligible securitization. This helps to explain the high
share of real estate loans on banks’ books in Spain. Another dierence from the U.S. is that
mortgage loans in Spain have full recourse to the borrower.
Banks in Spain can be classied in two broad categories: commercial banks and savings
banks (or Cajas). Out of the 192 banks in 2004Q4 for which we have nancial information,
there are 46 savings banks representing 41.9% of total bank assets. Commercial banks
are traditional banks (including foreign banks) that have shareholders as owners of the
bank. Cajas on the other hand rely on a general assembly for governance, consisting of
representatives of regional and municipal government, depositors representatives, and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) such as the catholic church, for instance. The general
assembly elects a board of directors who look for a professional manager to run the banking
business. Commercial banks prots can either be retained as reserves or pay out as dividends.
For the Cajas, the prots are either retained or paid out as social dividend (i.e. to build
and run educational facilities, libraries, sport facilities, pensioners clubs and so on where the
Cajas operate). However, despite their dierences in governance structures, both commercial
banks and Cajas operate under the same regulatory framework and compete against each
other in common markets.
Historically, Cajas have focused on households and engaged in providing mortgage and
deposit facilities. Commercial banks, on the other hand, have been more dominant in lending
into mortgages - often from the same bank - after sale of houses and then may be securitized.
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to the corporate sector. However there has been considerable convergence in the scope of
the two types of banks since liberalization began around mid-seventies. Nonetheless, there
remain dierences between Cajas and commercial banks today with Cajas being more reliant
on lending to real estate and household sectors.
3.3 The Securitization Boom
The global boom in market-mediated securitization is well known. Adrian and Shin (2010),
Shivdasani and Wang (2011) and Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Vickery (2010) show
that the issuance of non-GSE ABS and subprime MBS in the U.S. rose dramatically during
2004 to 2007. Securitization was driven by a series of global factors, such as global trade
imbalances and accommodative monetary policy in the U.S. Furthermore, the rise in se-
curitization was not limited to the U.S. Countries with characteristics similar to the U.S.,
such as large current account decits and a housing boom, also saw a rise in the issuance of
mortgage-backed securities. One such country was Spain.20
The lower-right panel in Figure 1 plots Spanish house prices over time. There is a sharp
increase in the growth of house prices beginning in 2001 that runs until 2007 when the global
recession kicks in. As with the U.S., the increase in house price appreciation is also associated
with a rapid increase in the issuance of securitized real estate assets in Spain (though the
boom in securitization came in 2005).
We use the term “securitization” for issuance of both covered bonds and asset-backed
securities by banks in Spain. While the two securities dier in some aspects, they share the
basic characteristic of allowing banks to access liquidity by pledging their real estate assets.
We explain these two securities in more detail below.
Covered bonds are backed by a portfolio of mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio of at
most 80%. Moreover, banks can only issue covered bonds up to 80% of the total value of
underlying mortgages. Finally, covered bonds also provide recourse to the issuing bank if
needed. Thus covered bonds are heavily collateralized, and their sole purpose is the provision
20In the case of Spain, the majority of buyers were from other Euro Area countries (notably Germany)
though they were also Asian (source: BIS, ECB and Bank of Spain).
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of liquidity. There is no capital advantage for issuing covered bonds and these bonds remain
on a bank’s balance sheet.
Asset backed securities (ABS) are issued by selling a portfolio of loans (usually mort-
gages). In Spain the originating bank is usually the servicer of loans as well. Thus one
important dierence between covered bonds and ABS is that ABS enable banks to transfer
some credit risk out of their balance sheet.
However, even this distinction is not black and white. In certain cases, banks provide
“credit enhancement” to an ABS, thus promising to absorb a certain percentage of the rst
losses in case of default. The accounting rules in Spain instructed banks to keep ABS on
their balance sheets if they retain some component of credit risk. Since we do not know
exactly whether a given ABS issuance is kept on the books or not, we cannot back out ABS
issuance at the bank level from bank balance sheets alone. This is one of the reasons we use
banks’ holding of real estate assets as our main proxy for access to securitization.
Figure 2 plots the aggregate issuance of asset-backed securities and covered bonds in
Spain over time. The top panel plots the annual  ow, while the bottom panel shows the
stock of securities issued. The issuance of securitized assets (whether ABS or covered) was
close to negligible in the early 2000s. However, by 2004 issuances become substantial with
over 50 billion Euros of securities issued every year. By 2008, the stock of securitized assets
represents 29.9% of total bank credit.
4 Securitization and the Lending Channel
What does the securitization shock imply for Spanish banks? As highlighted earlier, 44%
of bank loans are granted to the real estate sector in Spain. Therefore, securitization (i.e.
issuance of ABS and covered bonds) provides a novel opportunity for banks to use their
real estate assets as collateral for wholesale nancing. Securitization thus enhances a bank’s
access to liquidity, especially for banks with large loan portfolios backed by real estate assets.
Does greater access to liquidity encourage banks to make more loans to non-nancial,
non-real-estate rms? Relatedly, does enhanced liquidity lead banks to alter the terms at
which they lend? We test such credit supply channel consequences of securitization.
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4.1 Bank Level Evidence
The eect of securitization is not uniform across all banks. Since securitization depends on
real estate assets, banks with greater exposure to real estate assets are impacted more. This
is conrmed in the top panel of Figure 3 that plots the change in securitized assets between
2004 and 2007 for a bank against its exposure to real estate assets in 2000. One can see that
banks with greater exposure to real estate assets are able to securitize more assets.
This result is conrmed by columns (1) through (3) of Table III. Columns (1) and (2)
present the bivariate relationship in un-weighted and weighted (by bank assets) regressions.
The correlation between real estate exposure and securitization at the bank level is strong
and highly signicant. Since there is negligible securitization in the beginning of 2000s, an
equivalent test for new securities issued is to regress the stock of securities issued by 2007
against initial real estate assets. This is done in column (3) and the correlation becomes
even stronger.
Does increased access to liquidity due to securitization also lead banks to extend more
credit? The bottom panel of Figure 3 presents preliminary evidence in this regard. It plots
the change over 2004-07 in bank credit to non-real-estate sector against a bank’s initial
exposure to real estate. There is a strong and signicant relationship between the two. This
is further conrmed by column (4) of Table III. Column (5) shows that the same result holds
if we replace real estate exposure with issuance of new asset-backed securities between 2004
and 2007.
Figure 3 and Table III provide preliminary evidence in favor of the presence of a credit
channel at bank level. However, such evidence cannot be considered conclusive since banks
with higher real estate exposure (our ex-ante proxy, instrument, for securitization) might be
systematically dierent. For example, banks with higher exposure to real estate loans may
be lending to rms that experience faster credit demand growth during the housing boom.
If this were true, our bank level results would be spuriously driven by credit demand shocks,
and could not be attributed to credit supply consequences of securitization.
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4.2 Are Banks with Real-Estate Exposure Dierent?
Table IV tests whether banks with high real estate exposure are systematically dierent.
The top panel regresses various bank characteristics against banks’ exposure to real estate
assets and reports the coe!cient on real estate exposure.
Banks with more real estate exposure as of 2000Q1 are similar to other banks in terms
of protability (return on assets), risk (non-performing loans) and capital ratio. However
for reasons already highlighted, banks with real estate exposure are more likely to be Cajas
(saving banks).
The middle panel tests whether rms borrowing from banks with high real estate ex-
posure are systematically dierent. Since a rm may borrow from multiple banks, we take
the average of initial real estate exposure for banks lending to a given rm. We nd that
rms borrowing from banks with greater real estate exposure are smaller in size along all
dimensions — total assets, bank credit and sales. These rms also have higher tangible assets
to total assets ratio, and are less likely to borrow short term.
The bottom panel tests if loan level outcomes as of 2000 dier for banks with greater
real estate exposure. While there is no dierence in default rates, loans from banks with
more real estate exposure are smaller on average, more likely to be collateralized and more
likely to have longer maturities. The right-lower panel repeats these loan level tests, but
includes rm xed eects to focus only on within-rm variation. The loan size result goes
away, showing that conditional on lending to the same rm, loan amount does not dier
across banks with dierential real estate exposure.
The picture painted by Table IV reveals that banks with more real estate loans as a
fraction of their total loan portfolio do not dier by protability, risk, or capital, but are
more likely to be Cajas. In terms of their portfolio, real-estate exposed banks lend to smaller
rms that have more tangible assets and rely on longer term nancing. Consequently, loans
of real-estate dependent banks are more likely to be collateralized and have longer maturity.
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5 Estimating the Aggregate Lending Channel
Since rms borrowing from real estate exposed banks are quite dierent, there is a legitimate
concern that the increase in credit by these banks between 2004 and 2007 is not driven by
securitization, but by stronger credit demand from the type of rms borrowing from these
banks. Even if the rms borrowing from real estate exposed banks were not dierent on
observables, one could worry about dierences along unobservable dimensions. However, as
Section II explained, we can address such concern by using rms xed eects to fully absorb
changes in credit demand (fundamentals) at the rm level.
5.1 Local Lending Channel Estimates
We regress change in credit from 2004Q4 to 2007Q4 against a lender’s initial exposure to
real estate assets. We use real estate loan share as of 2000Q1 as our main proxy for banks’
exposure to securitization — rather than a direct measure of securitized assets — for three
reasons.
First, data on securitized assets is not available for some banks whereas real estate expo-
sure is available for all banks. Second, as we mentioned in the previous section, securitized
assets are not always kept on banks’ books. Therefore, it is di!cult to keep an accurate
count of securitized assets. However, we have already seen in Table II, banks with more real
estate loans issue more covered bonds and ABS (to the extent observed). Third, and per-
haps most importantly, what matters most for credit channel is the ability and expectation
of access to liquidity.21 Even for a bank that has not yet securitized many of its assets, the
knowledge that it has securitizable assets and hence access to liquidity could make it extend
new credit.22
Column (1) of Table V estimates equation (1) without rm xed eects. In line with the
bank-level results of Figure 3 and Table II, there is a strong correlation between business loan
21Bank credit supply (at w = 0 in a model à la Diamond and Rajan (2006) or Allen and Gale (2007))
depends on the expectation of accessing future liquidity (w = 1 in these models); therefore it is the potential
access to liquidity (via securitization) that matters most for credit supply rather than actual liquidity (at
w = 1 via securitization activity).
22Nonetheless our results are robust to using securitized assets by 2007 as our main right hand side variable.
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growth and a bank’s initial exposure to real estate assets. Can we attribute this correlation
to a credit supply eect? Since we need rm-xed eects to answer this question, we limit
ourselves to rms with multiple banking relationships as of 2004Q4. Column (2) restricts
sample to such rms with results similar to column(1).
Column (3) adds rm xed eects. The coe!cient on bank real estate exposure (0.386)
implies that a one standard deviation increase in real estate exposure generates a 6.1 per-
centage points higher growth in credit supply. This is more than a doubling of the average
loan-level credit growth rate of 5.7% between 2004Q4 and 2007Q4.23
Since real estate exposed banks tend to grant longer term and more collateralized loans,
there may be a residual concern that our results are driven by dierences in the types of
loans extended by real estate exposed banks. For example, perhaps credit boom was driven
by greater demand for longer term loans which happen to be the specialization of real estate
exposed banks. Column (4) therefore controls for a loan’s collateralization rate and maturity
as of 2004Q4 as well as changes in these variables between 2004Q4 and 2007Q4. There is no
appreciable change in the coe!cient of interest.
Finally, we know that savings banks (Cajas) are more likely to have high real estate
exposure. Could our results thus far be described as a Cajas phenomenon? We address this
issue in column(5) by including bank-type interacted with rm xed eects, where bank-type
is either “commercial” or “Cajas”. The regression thus forces comparison across loans of the
same rm and from the same bank-type. As results show, our coe!cient of interest is even
stronger than before.
Columns (2) through (5) go through a strong battery of tests to isolate the supply side
transmission channel driven by a bank’s exposure to real estate.24 Firm xed eects, loan
level controls, and bank-type interacted with rms xed eects control for credit demand
23This should not be confused with the overall growth in credit at the rm level, which is 21.4%. Loan-
level credit growth is smaller as a rm can stop borrowing from a bank between 2004 and 2007, and start
borrowing from a dierent bank.
24Other robustness tests we have run are: double cluster of standard errors at both rm and bank level;
controlling for other key bank characteristics such as capital, NPLs, size, prots and liquidity; controlling
for the average real estate exposure of other banks lending to the same rm; expanding to all rms including
loans to real estate rms; and, controlling for rm observables in rm level regressions where rm xed
eects are not possible (this only for the aggregate channel). Results are very similar.
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shocks in a nonparametric way. The strong power of controls can be gauged from the fact
that R-sq goes to 0.003 in column (2) to 0.7 in Column(5) without any decrease in the
coe!cients’ magnitude. As Altonji et al. (2005) point out, the persistence of a coe!cient
despite a substantial increase in regression R-sq due to controls provides strong support for
exogeneity of the right hand side variable of interest.
Finally, there may be a remaining concern that our results are driven by some pre-existing
trends in data. Column (6) tests for this by repeating our core specication over the period
2001Q4 to 2004Q4. The estimated coe!cient turns out to be negative and is statistically
indierent from zero.
A downside of the dependent variable we have used thus far (the "intensive margin") is
that we cannot compute change in loan amount for loans that are dropped before 2007Q4.
In order to take such “dropped loans” into account, we construct an indicator variable that
is 1 if a loan exists in 2004Q4 but not in 2007Q4, and 0 if it exists in both quarters.
Column (7) repeats our core specication using “loan dropped” as dependent variable
(i.e., the "extensive margin of dropped loans"). The number of loans increases in column (7)
from 32,647 to 51,397 because of the inclusion of all outstanding loans in 2004Q4 regardless
of their status in 2007Q4. Consistent with our earlier results, banks with higher real estate
exposure are less likely to drop a loan. Column (8) uses a Tobit specication to combine the
“intensive margin” eect of column (3) and the “extensive margin” result of column (7).
The combined eect of the two margins makes the overall impact in the credit channel even
stronger.
5.2 Aggregate Lending Channel Estimates
The results thus far highlight a strong credit supply channel eect driven by exposure to real
estate assets. However, as we emphasized in the Introduction and Section 2, these results are
incomplete as they do not incorporate rm-level adjustments in response to credit supply
shocks from banks. This section addresses this limitation by implementing the empirical
strategy highlighted in Section 2.
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coe!cient. The coe!cient is close to zero and precisely estimated. The unbiased estimate of
rm level credit channel is given by equation (3), which adjusts the coe!cient in column (9)
to take into account endogenous matching of rms with banks. Since the adjustment term
depends on the dierences between loan level OLS and xed eect estimate, it is going to
have a small eect in our case.25 The adjustment term is equal to (0.404-0.386)*0.025/0.0123,
i.e. 0.037. The unbiased rm level credit channel eect is thus equal to 0.023-0.043=-0.020.
It turns out that despite a very strong credit supply channel eect at the bank level, the net
impact is close to zero!26
Our result thus highlights the importance of incorporating rm level adjustments in credit
channel estimates. A simple correlation — or even causation — between bank credit extension
and bank liquidity shocks can be highly misleading. The speed at which rm-level borrowing
adjusts also points towards a dynamic banking system where borrowing relationships are
created and destroyed at regular frequency. Consistent with this view, we nd that about 45
percent of rms during our sample period break away an existing banking relationship and
start a new banking relationship with a dierent bank afterwards. Similarly, 75 percent of
all rms borrow from at least two banks during our sample period.
5.3 Quarter by Quarter Estimates
The regressions in Table V focused on the 2004Q4 to 2007Q4 period, which is the heart of
credit boom in Spain. Since the underlying data are quarterly and span a much longer time
horizon, we can replicate our estimates at a quarterly frequency over the entire period.
We anchor 2004Q4 as our reference quarter, and use { log(fuhglw) between quarter w and
2004Q4 as dependent variable for each quarter w from 2001Q4 to 2009Q4. We estimate the
OLS and FE regressions corresponding to columns (2) and (3) of table V respectively and
plot the corresponding coe!cients on bank exposure to real estate in the top panel of Figure
4. These coe!cients capture the evolution of loan-level credit channel in Spain.
25Our simulation exercise in section 1 shows that in general these adjustments can have a signicant
impact.
26Non-bank sources are unlikely to play a signicant role in our analysis since the net impact is close to
zero with only bank sources alone.
Column (9) presents the OLS (and potentially biased) estimate of rm-level credit channel
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Both OLS and FE estimates are close to zero until 2004Q4 and statistically not dierent
from zero.27 Thus the credit channel documented in Table V is not driven by any pre-existing
trend. There is no dierential growth in credit prior to 2004Q4 for loans granted by banks
with greater real estate exposure.
This nding also suggests that our earlier results are not driven by a boom in house
prices alone. As Figure 1 shows, the growth in house prices was as strong during the 2001-04
period as the 2004-07 period. If the credit channel eect in Table V was driven by real estate
exposed banks’ loan assets appreciating in value, we should see a similar eect over 2001 to
2004. The fact that we do not suggests that the credit channel eect is driven by the boom
in securitization that kicks into high gear between 2004 and 2007.
Our results indicate that once securitization market is strong enough in terms of volume
and is sustained over a long enough period, banks begin to rely on the newly found source
of liquidity and start lending against it. The credit channel eect of securitization builds
gradually over time until 2008, when the private market for securitization shuts down. Once
the global nancial crisis begins in fall of 2008, the credit channel in Spain turns negative:
Banks with greater ex-ante exposure to real estate assets start contracting credit at a faster
pace.
The top panel uses log change in loan amount outstanding as dependent variable. The
lower panel replicates the analysis but uses log change in total commitment amount as de-
pendent variable. The coe!cient estimates are similar to the top panel with one important
dierence. The post-2008 reversal in credit channel is stronger with loan commitment than
loan outstanding. This dierence re ects a stronger contraction in the supply of credit by
real-estate exposed banks through loan commitments. The dierential impact for outstand-
ing loans is smaller because the drawn to commitment ratio rises faster for banks with more
real estate exposure.28
The post-2008 reversal in bank lending channel at the loan level takes place despite
massive European Central Bank (ECB) intervention in the securitization market (banks
massively borrowed in the ECB/Eurosystem against their collateral). As Figure 2 makes
27Standard errors are not reported for brevity, but are similar to those shown in corresponding tables.
28This is similar to the nding in U.S. by Ivashina and Sharfstein (2009).
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clear, the  ow of asset-backed securities issued by Spanish banks in 2008 and beyond is
almost entirely driven by the interest of the banks to build up a portfolio of securities that
can be used as collateral for liquidity through the ECB. The private market for securitized
assets had pretty much evaporated by then.29 Our result thus illustrates that banks with
greater dependence on securitization start to cut back credit drastically — a credit crunch —
when private securitization market dries up.30 However, the net impact of this cut is not as
strong. As Figure 5 shows, rm level adjustment mutes the overall impact of bank-specic
cuts in credit during 2008-09.
The OLS and FE estimates track each other quite closely in Figure 4. Since the FE
estimate absorbs credit demand shocks at the rm-level, the compliance between OLS and FE
estimates show that credit demand shocks during our sample period are largely orthogonal
to credit supply shocks driven by exposure to real estate assets.
Figure 5 replicates rm-level OLS estimate of column (9) in Table V, but replaces the
dependent variable with log change in rm credit between quarter t and 2004Q4. As in
Figure 4, we plot the OLS coe!cient separately for each t from 2001Q4 to 2009Q4. The
top panel uses log change in rm credit outstanding as dependent variable, while the lower
panel uses log change in total loan commitment for a rm as dependent variable.
The dotted line in Figure 5 plots rm-level OLS coe!cients, while the solid line re ects
corresponding bias-corrected coe!cients implied by equation (3). Since loan-level OLS and
FE estimates in Figure 4 are close to each other, OLS and bias-corrected coe!cients do not
dier signicantly in Figure 5 either. The bias-corrected coe!cients in Figure 5 re ect the
net impact of credit channel over time. As in the case of 2004Q4-2007Q7 period, net impact
is close to zero throughout our sample period.
29Source: Dealogic, ECB and Bank of Spain.
30See e.g. Diamond and Rajan (2011), Shin (2009), Shleifer and Visnhy (2010), Allen and Gale (2007).
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6 Credit Terms, Real Outcomes and Extensive Margin
Lending
6.1 Local Lending Channel and Credit Terms
The local lending channel, i.e. loan-level impact of credit supply channel on credit quantity,
is undone by rm level adjustments for rms with multiple borrowing relationships. But
what about credit terms? Greater willingness by banks to extend credit supply could lead
to greater competition, hence putting downward pressure on credit terms.
While we do not observe interest rates, we know the fraction of loan commitment that
is drawn down by a borrower as well as loan maturity and collateralization rate. Changes
in loan draw-down rate (drawn credit over total commitment) during the credit boom gives
us useful information on the otherwise unobserved terms of credit (such as covenants and
interest rates). This idea is based on a revealed preference argument. As banks compete
more aggressively for a rm’s business, the rm should prefer to draw down more aggressively
from the bank with better loan terms.
Columns (1) through (3) in Table VI test if the draw-down ratio goes up faster during
2004Q4 to 2007Q4 for banks with greater exposure to real estate. Column (1) runs our core
specication on data restricted to multiple relationship rms as of 2004Q4. There is a strong
eect of bank real estate exposure on growth in drawn-down rate. A one standard deviation
increase in bank’s real estate exposure increases the drawn-down ratio by 1.33 percentage
points.
The increase in drawn-down ratio could have resulted from declining loan commitments.
However, as we have already seen in Figure 4, banks with greater real estate exposure are
increasing their loan commitments at a faster pace during 2004-07 period. The increase in
draw-down ratio despite faster growth in loan commitments from real-estate-exposed banks,
hence, points towards better loan terms oered by these banks.
Column (2) shows that the increase in drawn to commitment ratio is not driven by real
estate exposed banks making dierent types of loans. For example, if real estate exposed
banks granted more shorter maturity loans during the time period, such loans are naturally
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going to have higher drawn to commitment ratio. Column (2) adds loan maturity and
collateralization rate as of 2004Q4, as well as change in these variables between 2004Q4 and
2007Q4 as controls. There is no change in our coe!cient of interest. Column (3) further adds
rm xed eects, thus absorbing shocks at the rm level and isolating credit-supply-driven
changes in loan terms. Our coe!cient of interest increases slightly.
A direct measure of credit terms in our data is the fraction of loan that is collateralized.
If credit terms are relaxed over 2004-2007 by banks with more real estate exposure, then
we would expect rates of collateralization to go down more for these banks. Columns (4) to
(6) show that this is the case, although statistical signicance depends on the specication
chosen. However, once we control for loan maturity in 2004Q4 and change in loan maturity
between 2004Q4 and 2007Q4, the drop in collateralization rate is stronger and signicant
for banks with more real estate exposure. This is consistent with our earlier interpretation
that securitization leads to more favorable credit terms for borrowers.
The inclusion of controls for loan maturity is necessary when testing for dierences in
collateralization change for two reasons. First, as we saw in Table IV, real estate exposed
banks are more likely to have longer maturity loans which naturally have higher rates of
collateralization. Second, and more importantly, the change in propensity to make longer
term loans is also stronger for banks with real estate exposure. This is shown in columns
(7) though (9) of Table VI. Hence, as done in column (5), it is important to control for loan
maturity and changes in loan maturity when comparing dierences in collateralization rates.
Figure 6 plot the quarter-by-quarter OLS and FE coe!cients for drawn-to-commitment
and collateralization rate. The sharp increase in drawn to commitment ratio for real estate
exposed banks kicks in around 2005. Before 2005 there is no dierential eect. Similar,
though a bit weaker, results hold for collateralization rate as well.
6.2 Aggregate Lending Channel, Credit Terms and Real Out-
comes
Our methodology for estimating the net impact of credit channel at rm level (i.e. the
aggregate lending channel) can be applied to any outcome where we can estimate OLS and
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FE regressions separately at loan level. Since we have done so for changes in drawn-to-
commitment ratio, maturity and collateralization, we can estimate their bias-corrected rm
level impact as well. Columns (1) though (3) in Table VII show that changes in all three of
these outcomes are signicant at rm level.
Thus while loan level impact in credit quantity is undone by rm-level adjustments, the
same is not true for credit terms! As banks with real estate exposure become more willing
to extend credit, there is greater competition for a given rm’s overall debt capacity. The
competition results in borrowing rms receiving softer, more favorable credit terms.
Despite the zero impact of securitization-induced credit supply channel on the quantity
of credit, there could be positive rm real eects through the induced lower price of credit.
Columns (4) through (6) of Table VII show that rms borrowing from banks with greater
real estate exposure do not experience any dierential change in propensity to default, sales
or number of employees. There is thus no evidence of any appreciable impact on real rm
outcomes over the period 2004 to 2007 due to securitization. Hence, despite of large eects
at the bank-rm level, the crowding-out completely mitigates these eects for rm real
outcomes.
6.3 Extending Credit to New Clients
So far our core analysis was based on loans outstanding in 2004Q4, which were followed for-
ward in time. Banks with greater exposure to real estate assets increased their credit supply
for existing loans as securitization kicked in. While this credit channel is counter-balanced
by crowding out adjustments at rm level, the question remains whether securitization led to
a net increase in credit for new borrowers. A shift in the supply of bank credit should make
banks more willing to lend to riskier rms on the extensive margin (see e.g. Shin, 2009).
These rms may have been denied credit in the past, but with securitization expanding the
supply of credit, they have a better chance of getting a loan.
Table VIII tests whether banks with greater real estate exposure lend more to new clients
on the extensive margin. We dene “new credit” as credit given to rst-time clients between
2004Q4 and 2007Q4 and regress the log of total new credit against a bank’s initial exposure
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to real estate assets. We nd that banks more exposed ex-ante to real estate are signicantly
more likely to make loans to new clients on the extensive margin. Column (2) replaces new
credit drawn with new total credit commitments and gets similar results.
Column (3) normalizes new credit outstanding by total assets of the bank. The estimated
coe!cient implies that a one standard deviation increase in real estate exposure is associated
with the bank lending out 10.4 percent more of its assets as credit to new clients. New bank
clients can be of two types: rms that never borrowed from any bank in the past, and rms
that start borrowing from the given bank for the rst time after 2004Q4. Column (4) splits
these two types by only focusing on lending to rms that never borrowed from any bank
in the past. The coe!cient drop to 0.38 from 0.665, showing that more than half of our
extensive margin result is driven by lending to rms that did not borrow from any bank in
the past.
Column (5) shows that new credit driven by exposure to real estate assets is signicantly
more likely to default by the end of 2009. We regress the 2009Q4 default rate of new
credit against initial bank exposure to real estate. The estimated coe!cient is statistically
signicant and economically large in magnitude. A one standard deviation increase in bank
exposure to real estate is associated with 1.03 percentage point increase in default rate for
new credit.31
Figure 7 plots the quarter-by-quarter estimates of columns (3) and (4). The dependent
variable is new credit granted between 2004Q4 and quarter w, with w going from 2005Q1 to
2009Q4. The dierential growth in new credit continues until 2008, before collapsing as the
nancial crisis kicks in.
The extensive margin regressions are run at bank level and hence suer from the usual
criticism that unobserved credit demand shocks might contaminate our coe!cients. We
cannot use our rm xed eects approach to tease out the supply-driven eect anymore.
However, our earlier results are useful for interpreting causality of our extensive margin
results.
31The power gets weak if we try to split defaults by borrowers that did not borrow from any bank in the
past, and borrowers that are rst-time borrowers with the said bank. However, the coe!cient on bank RE
exposure is positive for both these groups.
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The estimated covariance between credit demand and credit supply shocks for rms
borrowing from multiple banks in 2004Q4 was close to zero. It is reasonable to assume that
similar correlation holds on the extensive margin as well. For instance, given the estimated
covariance term for existing borrowers, it is unlikely that credit demand from future potential
clients will go up disproportionately more for rms that tend to apply for loans with real-
estate-exposed banks. We thus feel condent in interpreting the coe!cients in Table VIII as
being driven by supply-side shocks as well.
7 Concluding Remarks
As the securitization market threatened to dry up and banks suered major losses, govern-
ments all over the world fretted about the possibility of banks transmitting their adverse
shocks through a credit crunch to the rest of the economy. Many governments and central
banks (including the U.S. and Europe) intervened in the banking sector with large sums
of money to try to prevent any amplication of the downturn through the banking system.
Such fears are common in almost all instances of nancial downturns. In fact, even in normal
times, policy makers set monetary and credit policies with one eye open towards possible
ramications for the bank transmission channel.
However, despite the importance attached to bank transmission channels in real life, we
lack a basic set of tools that policy makers can use in real time for understanding the impact
of transmission mechanisms. The goal of this paper was two-fold: (i) to introduce a formal
procedure that takes an aggregate approach towards transmission mechanisms by taking into
account equilibrium eects at the rm level and (ii) to identify, by using of our methodology,
the transmission consequences of mortgage securitization.
It would be imprudent to suggest that bank transmission channel is always important,
or that it is never relevant. The nature and magnitude of transmission channel is likely
to depend on the particular environment and episode in question. Since each situation is
dierent, we need a set of tools — rather than a pre-determined answer — to guide us in the
real world.
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The methodology introduced in this paper can serve as one of the tools used by the new
supervisory agencies both in U.S. and Europe in charge of monitoring systematic risk. There
are three main advantages that our methodology provides in this regard. First, it can be
applied to a range of dierent situations where the shock aecting the banking sector may
not be securitization necessarily. As long as one can identify cross-bank heterogeneity in
exposure to possible banking sector shocks (e.g. some form of nancial innovation, bank
runs, specic industry or country exposure), our methodology can be utilized to separate
supply-side eects from demand and to estimate local as well as aggregate lending channels.
Second, our methodology can be used to identify both the quantity and price eects of
shifts in the supply of bank credit. Credit booms are often associated with more favorable,
softer credit terms for borrowers, such as lower collateral requirements, decline in credit
spreads, or more “covenant light” loans. Our methodology provides a formal mechanism for
understanding the extent to which such changes in the price of credit are driven by expansion
on the supply side.
The methodology introduced in this paper goes beyond estimating whether banks per se
transmit the liquidity shocks they face. It takes into account equilibrium adjustments that
rms may undertake in response to any shocks from the banking system. As our results from
Spain illustrate, this latter step is critical: without it one could have incorrectly concluded
that securitization had a big impact on credit quantity for all rms. Instead we nd that the
aggregate impact of securitization in terms of credit quantity was limited to new borrowers,
while credit terms were relaxed for all borrowers.
Given the importance of securitization over the last decade (including the crisis) and,
in general, the possible role of nancial innovation in promoting excessive credit creation
and risk taking for crises in the past (emphasized by a number of economic historians), our
results on the impact of securitization on bank credit supply and risk are of independent
interest. More recently, securitization has been associated with lax lending and excessive
credit creation in mortgage markets during the 2000’s (Keys et al (2010) and Mian and Su
(2009))..
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mission channel? Our analysis provides some mixed results in this regard. For rms that
already had strong access to the banking sector, securitization did not lead to an increase in
quantity of credit. There is no evidence that securitization had an appreciable eect on real
rm outcomes either.
Securitization did, however, lead to more relaxed credit terms for all rms. There is also
a strong eect of securitization on credit to new borrowers. Securitization enabled banks
with real estate assets to expand credit supply on the extensive margin. The new loans are
riskier with greater propensity to default during the crisis, suggesting that bank’s relaxed
their screening rules in order to expand credit supply.
Did these problems also spill over to non-nancial corporate sector through bank trans-
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The top-left panel plots the cumulative distribution function for firm-level bank debt (solid line), and bank-level total lending
(dashed line). The top-right panel plots total bank loan commitments to the non-real estate and non-financial sector in Spain.
The bottom-left panel plots default rate for Spanish firms over time (limited to non-real estate and non-financial sector). The
bottom-right panel plots the log of residential house price index in Spain.
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The top panel plots the annual flow of asset-backed securities issued in Spain. The
solid line includes both ABS and covered bond issuance, while the dotted line only
includes ABS issuance. The shaded area post 2007 represents ABS issuance that
was put as collateral with the ECB for liquidity support. The bottom panel plots
the stock of ABS and covered bonds over time in Spain.
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Figure 3
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Initial Exposure To Mortgage Assets
The top panel plots change in securitized assets (covered bonds and ABS) at the
bank-level between 2004 and 2007 (normalized by bank total assets in 2004) against
initial exposure to mortgage assets in 2000. Exposure to mortgage assets is defined
as the share of total bank loans that go to the real estate sector. The size of each
bank-level observation in the plot is proportional to bank size. The bottom panel
plots the 2004 to 2007 change in log bank credit to non-real estate and non-financial
sector against banks initial exposure to mortgage assets.
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Figure 4










































































































































































































FE coefficients OLS coefficients
The top panel plots the coefficient estimates for βt for the following specification
for each quarter t:
yijt − yij,04q4 = αt + βt ∗REexposurei,2000 + ηjt + εijt
where y is the natural logarithm of loan amount outstanding for firm j from bank
i. REexposurei,2000 is the share of loan portfolio exposed to real estate for bank
i in 2000. The OLS coefficient estimates do not include the firm fixed effects term,
ηjt. The bottom panel repeats the same exercise after replacing y with the natural
logarithm of loan commitment for firm j from bank i.
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Figure 5


































































































































































The top panel plots the coefficient estimates for βt for the following specification
for each quarter t:
yjt − yj,04q4 = αt + β
t ∗REexposurej,2000 + εjt
where y is the natural logarithm of total credit outstanding for firm j.
REexposurej,2000 is the average real estate exposure in 2000 of banks lending to
firm j at time t. The solid line in top panel “bias corrects” the coefficient estimate
according to equation (3) in the paper. The bottom panel repeats the same exercise
after replacing y with the natural logarithm of total commitment for firm j.
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Figure 6









































































































































































































































































































































































The top panel plots the coefficient estimates for βt for the following specification for each quarter t:
yijt − yij,04q4 = αt + βt ∗REexposurei,2000 + ηjt + εijt
where y is the drawn to commitment ratio for firm j from bank i. REexposurei,2000 is the share of loan portfolio exposed
to real estate for bank i in 2000. The OLS coefficient estimates do not include the firm fixed effects term, ηjt. The bottom
panel repeats the same exercise after replacing y with collateralization rate of loan for firm j from bank i.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1124
Figure 7














































































































































































The top panel plots the coefficient estimates for βt for the following specification
for each quarter t:
yit = α
t + βt ∗REexposurei,2000 + εijt
where y is the ratio of credit given to new clients since 2004q4 and total outstand-
ing loans of bank i. REexposurei,2000 is the share of loan portfolio exposed to
real estate for bank i in 2000. The bottom panel repeats the same exercise after
replacing y with the default rate for new credit.
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Table I
Simulation Of The Lending Channel – β= 0.5
Panel A
Λ = 0% Λ = 50% Λ = 100%
ρ -0.50 0.00 0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.50
̂βOLS 0.0619 0.5036 0.9514 0.0522 0.4966 0.9425 0.0627 0.5016 0.9395
̂βFE 0.5000 0.4998 0.4999 0.4994 0.4997 0.4997 0.4995 0.5009 0.4999
̂βOLS -0.2497 0.5025 1.2709 -0.5057 0.2432 1.0109 -0.7446 0.0009 0.7536
β 0.4941 0.4942 0.5008 0.2510 0.2496 0.2599 -0.0058 -0.0009 0.0098
Panel B
Λ = 0% Λ = 50% Λ = 100%
ρ -0.50 0.00 0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.50
̂βOLS 0.0551 0.4904 0.9195 0.0567 0.4915 0.9130 0.0625 0.4951 0.9260
̂βFE 0.4999 0.5003 0.4996 0.4988 0.5002 0.4991 0.5007 0.5006 0.4999
̂βOLS -0.1005 0.4921 1.0854 -0.3265 0.2537 0.8365 -0.5917 -0.0050 0.5903
β 0.4854 0.5066 0.5295 0.2555 0.2667 0.2894 -0.0098 0.0030 0.0250
dropped 0.3811 0.3725 0.3685 0.3790 0.3743 0.3671 0.3799 0.3743 0.3702
This table reports the mean of 100 OLS and FE parameter estimates of the lending channel at the loan level
(̂βOLS and
̂βFE), OLS estimates at the firm level (
̂βOLS), as well as “bias corrected” estimates (β). We report
parameter estimates for different correlation values between the firm- and bank-speficic shocks at the loan level
ranging from ρ = −0.50 to ρ = 0.50 for different substitution levels Λ assuming normally distributed shocks with
a mean 0 of and a standard deviation of 1. In Panel B we allow for the possibility that loans are dropped.
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Table II
Summary Statistics
All Firms Multiple Relationsship Firms
N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
Loan Level Variables
Banks initial exposure to real estate assets 67,838 0.466 0.156 51,397 0.460 0.158
Loan amount outstanding (2004Q4) 67,838 288.1 3191.9 51,397 295.899 1637.3
Log loan amount within firm (2004Q4) 63,941 0.000 0.852 49,787 0.000 0.966
Loan amount committed (2004Q4) 67,838 367 3608.2 51,397 376.4 2169.2
Default Rate (2004Q4) 63,941 0.019 0.134 49,787 0.017 0.129
Loan drawn to commitment ratio (2004Q4) 67,838 81.066 30.752 51,397 83.2 27.9
Collateralization rate (2004Q4) 67,838 0.195 0.371 51,397 0.148 0.330
Maturity greater than 5 years (2004Q4) 67,838 0.230 0.390 51,397 0.185 0.356
Δ log loan amount, 01Q4 to 04Q4 33,274 -0.004 1.146 26,262 0.013 1.145
Δ default rate, 01Q4 to 04Q4 33,274 0.020 0.151 26,262 0.019 0.146
Δ log loan amount, 04Q4 to 07Q4 42,609 0.057 1.223 32,647 0.059 1.217
Δ log loan amount, 04Q4 to 07Q4 (within firm) 42,609 0.000 0.754 32,647 0.000 0.861
Δ default rate, 04Q4 to 07Q4 42,609 0.019 0.140 32,647 0.021 0.147
Δ log loan amount, 07Q4 to 09Q4 31,298 -0.250 1.016 23,322 -0.252 1.034
Δ default rate, 07Q4 to 09Q4 31,298 0.061 0.241 23,322 0.074 0.263
Firm Level Variables
Banks initial exposure to real estate assets 29,848 0.471 0.131 15,697 0.463 0.111
Number of banking relationships (2004Q4) 29,848 2.250 1.848 15,697 3.302 2.017
Loan amount outstanding (2004Q4) 29,848 662 6720.6 15,697 982.507 7101.2
Commitment amount (2004Q4) 29,848 836.5 7833.6 15,697 1249.2 8681.9
Default Rate (2004Q4) 29,848 0.021 0.135 15,697 0.017 0.119
Total Assets (2004Q4) 14,984 4547.1 52221 9,093 6238.4 66362.5
Total Sales (2004Q4) 14,984 5155.4 67860 9,093 7028 86285.2
Total Employees 12,672 28.951 278.7 7,850 37.263 351.6
Δ log loan amount, 01Q4 to 04Q4 20,998 0.146 1.193 12,627 0.384 1.019
Δ default rate, 01Q4 to 04Q4 20,998 0.017 0.142 12,627 0.015 0.125
Δ log sales, 01Q4 to 04Q4 8,606 0.213 0.627 5,837 0.23 0.587
Δ log loan amount, 04Q4 to 07Q4 25,154 0.214 1.263 14,074 0.048 1.098
Δ default rate, 04Q4 to 07Q4 25,154 0.018 0.137 14,074 0.023 0.154
Δ log sales, 04Q4 to 07Q4 11,088 0.232 0.68 7,019 0.221 0.626
Δ log loan amount, 07Q4 to 09Q4 22,120 -0.204 0.942 12,681 -0.232 0.923
Δ default rate, 07Q4 to 09Q4 22,120 0.050 0.209 12,681 0.063 0.230
Δ log sales, 07Q4 to 09Q4 11,191 0.058 0.392 6,932 0.049 0.363
Bank Level Variables
Total Assets (2004Q4) 192 7.8E+06 2.5E+07
Initial exposure to real estate assets 191 0.440 0.157
Capital ratio (2004Q4) 191 6.686 3.922
Return on assets (2004Q4) 191 0.945 0.483
This table presents summary statistics for loans outstanding as of 2004Q4. The underlying data represents
a 10% random sample of all loans in Spain, with sampling done at firm level. A loan is defined as a
firm-bank pair, i.e. separate loans from a bank to the same firm are aggregated at the firm level. Multiple



































Securitization and Initial Real Estate Exposure
Securitized
Assets Over
Δ Securitized Assets Over Total Assets
Total Assets (‘04 to ‘07) (2007) Δ Log Bank Credit (‘04 to ‘07)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank RE Exposure
0.197∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 1.01 ∗ ∗∗
(0.064) (0.075) (0.084) (0.32)
Securitized Assets Over 1.12 ∗ ∗∗
Total Assets (2004 to 2007) (0.415)
Constant
0.036 0.073∗ 0.15 ∗ ∗∗ −0.014 0.24 ∗ ∗
(0.029) (0.039) (0.041) (0.18) (0.12)
OLS WLS WLS WLS WLS
N 179 179 179 178 178
R2 0.063 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.12
This table presents bank-level regressions relating the change in securitized assets and change in bank credit between 2004Q4
and 2007Q4 to a banks initial exposure to real estate assets. Banks initial exposure to real estate is defined as the fraction
of total loans that is given out to the real estate sector (residential, commercial, and construction) as of 2000Q1. All
specifications report robust standard errors. ***,**,* imply that coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table IV
Correlation Between Banks Exposure To Real Estate And Initial Characteristics
Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e.
Bank Level Variables (2000Q1)
Return on assets 1.896 (1.569)
Total Default Rate 0.0009 (0.0046)
Capital Ratio −0.705 (2.642)
Cajas? 0.935∗∗∗ (0.120)
Firm Level Variables (2005Q4)
Default rate 0.0104 (0.0114)
Total assets −7549.001∗∗∗ (1739.05)
Log total assets −0.846∗∗∗ (0.147)
Total credit −469.860 ∗ ∗ (253.369)
Log total credit −0.802 ∗ ∗ (0.379)
Total sales −8349.19 ∗ ∗∗ (1836.714)
Log total sales −1.225∗∗∗ (0.173)
Number of banking relationships −0.004 (0.343)
Tangible assets ratio 19.109∗∗∗ (2.912)
Short term debt ratio −27.557∗∗∗ (3.213)
Loan Level Variables (2005Q4) With firm fixed effects
Default Rate 0.013 (0.008) 0.007 (0.004)
Loan amount −300.276∗∗∗ (126.888) −68.16 (83.267)
Log loan amount −0.123 (0.312) 0.147 (0.285)
Collateralization rate 0.266∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.034)
Maturity greater than 5 years 0.204∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.106 (0.069)
This table regresses various bank, firm and loan characteristics on banks exposure to real estate assets in
2000, and reports the coefficient and standard error on bank exposure variable. Banks initial exposure to
real estate is defined as the fraction of total loans that is given out to the real estate sector (residential,
commercial, and construction) as of 2000Q1. ***,**,* imply that coefficient estimates are significant at



































Securitization And The Credit Channel
Δ Firm-
Δ Log Level Log
Drawn Drawn
(01Q4 to Loan (04Q4 to
Δ Log Drawn (04Q4 to 07Q4) 04Q4) Dropped? Tobit 07Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bank RE Exposure
0.366∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.419∗ −0.135 −0.245∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.099) (0.104) (0.113) (0.111) (0.225) (0.145) (0.070) (0.285) (0.100)
Firm-Bank Type fixed effects No No No No Yes No No No -
Loan controls No No No Yes No No No No -
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes - Yes Yes No No
Data restricted to firms with
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
multiple relationships
N 42,609 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647 26,262 51,397 51,397 14,074
R2 0.002 0.003 0.50 0.51 0.70 0.53 0.46 0.00
This table presents coefficient estimates from specifications at the loan (firm-bank) level relating the growth in bank credit from 2004Q4 to 2007Q4 to lending banks
initial exposure to real estate. Column (8) runs a tobit specification, taking into account that change in lending is censored for firms dropped by banks (or log loan
amount dropping by more than -1.82, i.e. the bottom 5th percentile). Banks initial exposure to real estate is the fraction of total loans that is given to mortgages and
construction/ real estate as of 2000:Q1. Loan controls include collateral and maturity. A firm is defined to have multiple relationships if it borrows from at least two
banks of 2004:Q4. All specifications include a constant (not reported) and errors are cluster at the bank level. ***,**,* Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from



































Securitization And Loan Terms
Change in Loan conditions from 2004Q4 to 2007Q4
Drawn to Committed Ratio Collateralization Rate Long-term maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bank RE Exposure
8.28 ∗ ∗∗ 8.33 ∗ ∗∗ 8.51 ∗ ∗∗ −0.016 −0.065 ∗ ∗ −0.048 0.134 0.16 ∗ ∗ 0.13 ∗ ∗
(2.69) (2.65) (3.34) (0.0114) (0.033) (0.03) (0.084) (0.067) (0.062)
Loan Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Data restricted to firms
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
with multiple relationships
N 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647 32,647
R2 0.0027 0.0410 0.50 0.0001 0.25 0.62 0.0052 0.15 0.46
This table presents coefficient estimates from specifications at the loan (firm-bank) level relating the change in loan conditions from 2004Q4 to 2007Q4 to lending
banks exposure to real estate. We use three different loan conditions: change in drawn to committed credit in column 1 to 3, change in collateralization rate in
column 4 to 6 and change in long term maturity (over 5 years) in column 7 to 9. Loan controls in (2) and (3) include maturity and collateralization rate as of
2004Q4 as well as changes in these two variables during 2004-07. Loan controls in (5) and (6) have maturity as of 2004Q4 as well as change in this variable
during 2004-07. Loan controls in (8) and (9) have collateralization rate as of 2004Q4 as well as change in this variable during 2004-07. All specifications include
a constant (not reported) and errors are cluster at the bank level. Banks initial exposure to real estate is defined as the fraction of total loans that is given out to





































Δ(drawn to commit) Δ(%long-term) Δ(collateral rate) Δ(default rate) Δ(log sales) Δ(employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Banks’ RE Exposure
6.86 ∗ ∗∗ 0.054 ∗ ∗ −0.10 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0025 0.045
(1.26) (0.026) (0.019) (0.022) (0.059) (0.081)
Bias-Corrected Coefficient 7.38 0.066 −0.074
Data restricted to firms with
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
multiple relationships
N 14,277 14,277 14,277 14,277 7,019 5,964
R2 0.0012 0.0005 0.0019 0 0 0.0001
This table presents coefficient estimates from specifications at the firm level relating the growth in firm level outcomes to a firms banks initial exposure to real estate
assets. Banks initial exposure to real estate is defined as the fraction of total loans that is given out to the real estate sector (residential, commercial, and construction)
as of 2000Q1. Firm banks real estate exposure is the weighted average of a firms lending banks exposure to real estate as of 2000Q1. Bias-corrected coefficients are
calculated using the methodology outline in equation (3) of the paper. The calculations are as follows: Column (1), 7.38 = 6.86 + (8.54 − 8.28) ∗ (0.1572/0.1112).
Column (2), 0.066 = 0.054 + (0.14 − 0.134)) ∗ (0.1572/0.1112). Column (3), −0.074 = −0.10 + (−0.0030 + 0.016) ∗ (0.1572/0.1112). All specifications include a
constant (not reported) and errors are cluster at the lead-bank level. ***,**,* imply that coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table VIII
Extensive Margin – Extension of Credit to New Clients
New Firms
Log Log Drawn Drawn
Drawn Commitment Normalized Normalized Defaults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank RE Exposure
1.97 ∗ ∗ 1.69 ∗ ∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗
(0.79) (0.73) (0.22) (0.153) (0.0287)
Constant
7.99 ∗ ∗∗ 8.37 ∗ ∗∗ 0.193∗ 0.115∗ 0.0061
(0.39) (0.37) (0.11) (0.060) (0.012)
N 175 177 179 179 163
R2 0.025 0.019 0.064 0.08 0.068
This table presents coefficient estimates from specifications at the bank level relating lending given out to
new clients by banks between 2004Q4 and 2007Q4 to a banks initial real estate exposure. Banks initial
exposure to real estate is defined as the fraction of total loans that is given out to the real estate sector
(residential, commercial, and construction) as of 2000Q1. ***,**,* imply that coefficient estimates are
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All specifications report robust standard errors.
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